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Abstract. Auction mechanisms have recently gained increasing attention as an
alternative approach for pricing Internet resources. For the case of divisible com-
modities over single links, Generalized Vickrey Auctions (GVA) are already a
well-established standard mechanism, whereas an abundance of unsolved prob-
lems is related to the generalization of GVAs in space and time, i.e. for the case
of connections over multiple links and for session holding times that require to
win a series of consecutive periodic auctions. This paper focuses on the latter
multi-period aspect which is typical for any type of multimedia applications like
QoS-enabled conferencing or videostreaming. First, a Markovian property for
efficient bidding is derived, and various user strategies are simulated and evalu-
ated, before a suitable auction protocol is described. Eventually, the novel con-
cept of a “Second-chance Auction Mechanism” (SAM) leads to an increase in
economic efficiency without imposing significant additional overhead.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Recent years have, both in industry and academia, seen rapidly rising interest in
Quality-of-Service provision for future Internet services. Architecture proposals like
Integrated Services (IntServ) or Differentiated Services (DiffServ) have left the tradi-
tional best-effort paradigm behind, whereas at the same time the search for feasible
and efficient charging mechanism for a QoS-enabled Internet has begun. The resulting
new multi-disciplinary research area has been named “Internet Economics” [12] and
eventually aims at bringing together economy-, customer-, and technology-driven
forces in order to establish an Internet that is ruled by market competition and market
management. [13] has introduced the so-called “NUT Trilemma” between Network
efficiency, User acceptance, and Technical feasibility to describe this balance situation
in more detail.
As a result of these recent efforts, a substantial body of new proposals for Internet
charging schemes has grown (for a survey we refer to [3], [15], and references therein).
Given the ultimate goal of a market-managed Internet, it is not surprising that most of
these concepts look quite familiar and are already well-established in many areas of
everyday life. This is especially valid for the idea of using auctions for determining the
market price of a commodity like bandwidth. Since the seminal paper [11] this
approach is known as “smart market” and has become an integral part of the standard
Internet pricing repertoire. From an economic perspective, there is an abundance of related work on auction
theory (for an excellent literature survey we refer to the introductory chapter of [8]).
As far as communication network aspects are concerned, the papers usually focus
either on packet auctions [11] or bandwidth auctions over a single link [9]. More prac-
tically, auctions have been investigated in the context of routing [6] and decentralized
scheduling [17], before recently auction-based bandwidth allocation over paths has
received some interest [1][7][14].
The present paper deals with auctions for multi-period sessions and multi-link con-
nections in the Internet. Note that these cases turn out to be closely related, with
“multi-period sessions” describing the temporal aspect of an end-to-end application
running over a couple of consecutive auction periods, whereas the term “multi-link
connection” refers to the spatial aspect of such an application using several concate-
nated links. We assume that auctions are performed periodically in the network and
independently on each link, and sessions/connections have to win independent auc-
tions for two or more oncatenated links and/or subsequent periods, resp., in order to
terminate correctly. 
The remainder of this paper will focus on the multi-period case and is structured as
follows: Section 2 provides a short overview on auction mechanisms for the Internet
and identifies relevant problem areas related to multi-period and/or multi-link auc-
tions, before Section 3 investigates the multi-period single-link case with respect to
properties of efficient bidding strategies. Section 4 introduces the novel concept of
“Second-Chance Auctions” and provides a simulative evaluation of the resulting Sec-
ond-chance Auction Mechanism (SAM). Section 5 specifies an auction protocol for
second-chance mechanisms, before Section 6 presents some remarks on current and
future work, especially for the case of multi-link connections. 
2 Auction Mechanisms for Internet Resources
After introducing the “smart market” concept, this section presents a detailed survey
of relevant problems related to the multi-link multi-period generalization of this
approach.
2.1 Smart Market and Generalized Vickrey Auctions
Vickrey [16] has introduced an auction mechanism that assigns the good to the high-
est bidder, while the winner is not charged her own bid, but only the second-highest
bid (i.e. the highest losing bid). With this so-called “Second-Price Auction”, it is a
dominant strategy for each bidder to truthfully reveal her correct valuation of the good
[9]. This property is called “incentive compatibility” and is shown in [10] to hold also
for the case of multiple (divisible) commodities and arbitrary externalities, yielding
“Generalized Vickrey Auctions” (GVA). Note that the charge to be paid by the winner
is slightly more complicated with GVA, leading to a payment scheme that strongly
resembles progressive income taxation [9]. 
The main difference between this “smart market” approach [11] and current Internet
technology becomes apparent under congestion: if a resource becomes congested, the
“best effort” paradigm assumes packets to be queued, delayed, or even lost, whereasthe “smart market” concept leads to a relative packet or flow prioritization based on
the value assigned to them by the respective user herself. 
2.2 General Aspects of Auctioning Multi-link Multi-period Sessions
It has been widely accepted that a straightforward application of the GVA mecha-
nism as sketched in the previous section to Internet flow charging is a non-trivial task,
due to inherent complexity and synchronization issues [14]. In the case of GVA for
multi-link scenarios and multi-period sessions, the following complexity aspects have
to be distinguished:
• Combinatorial Auctions: Under an end-to-end and QoS-enabled perspective of
Internet connections comprising several individual links, the commodity to be auc-
tioned is combined of several independent units, thus requiring a combinatorial
auction scheme. This is also true for the multi-period generalization. It is well-
known that this auction type in general leads to an NP-complete problem [18].
• Bid Distribution: As soon as users bid for whole sessions, but links and/or periods
are auctioned individually, the question of how to distribute such a global bid (or
“bid level” [7]) among these link and period auctions (partial bids) arises. 
• Inter-auction Synchronization and Setup Delay: If in a distributed system (e.g. a
“global” connection) each individual link performs an independent (“local”) auc-
tion on its own, all auctions along a given path have to be synchronized. [14] shows
that for n links in the end-to-end connection, in the worst case the additional setup
delay may on average sum up to n/2 times the auction period.
• Granularity: Also the sheer number of auctions to be performed may cause severe
problems, e.g. in the case of auctioning single packets on their way from a sender
to a receiver. Aggregating packets into (micro-)flows can bring some relief to this
issue.
• Locality: Each end-to-end connection comprises in general a set of links that are
subject to individual auctions. As it is necessary to simultaneously hold all these
links in order to run a session, severe problems arise as soon as local congestion
events causes the loss of one individual auction, leading eventually to the termina-
tion of the entire connection as a global consequence. Again, the analogous prob-
lem arises in the multi-period case.
• Signalling Overhead: Like any congestion pricing scheme, auction mechanisms
start to increase signalling activity as soon as resources become crowded. If the
link utilization is no longer for free, the respective charge as an outcome of an auc-
tion needs to be communicated to customers.
Note that not all of these problems are independent from each other. Thus, for the rest
of the paper, we will restrict our attention to the relationship between the Bid
Distribution Problem and the Locality Problem. 
3 Bidding in Multi-Period Second-Price Auctions
Consider a single link whose capacity is auctioned periodically between interested
users. If a user performs a session whose holding time T is longer than the auctionperiod, it becomes necessary for her to participate in two or more subsequent auctions
in order to get the required resources. Such a series of subsequent auctions is also
called “multi-period” auction. As a typical example for such a scenario, consider the
setup of a Voice-over-IP session signalled by the SIP or H.323 protocol. 
3.1 User Valuation Metrics for Partially Finished Sessions
In general, the user is interested in an uninterrupted course of her session, i.e. her
valuation (and thus her budget) will be an increasing and convex function over time. In
the “inelastic” case, a user has to win all T consecutive auctions in order to gain a value
of  , whereas failing to win all auctions does not return any value. Here,
 is defined as user valuation (budget) of a session having a total length of T peri-
ods that is terminated after period τ, and in the inelastic case turns out to be the follow-
ing step-function: 
 with indicator function   . (1)
“Elastic” scenarios, on the contrary, may yield e.g.   as a linear-
additive valuation function or e.g.   as a multiplica-
tive function, where the value of a session to the user increases per period by a fixed
amount   or by a fixed factor  , resp. In any case, upon winning auction τ, the
bidder immediately pays the resulting auction price  , τ = 1, ..., T. Depending on the
auction type,   is either the submitted bid (first-price auctions) or a market-clearing
price (second-price auctions).
3.2 Expected Utility in the Inelastic Case
For the rest of the paper, we will stay with the inelastic valuation metric (1). Follow-
ing [18], let   be the probability for winning auction τ. Then, the optimal bidding
strategy under steady-state conditions maximizes the expected utility
,( 2 )
i.e. the user’s valuation times the probability she wins all T auctions minus the total
charge she has to pay in this case as sum of the respective individual auction outcomes.
The following result allows to describe the utility function for T+1 as linear combi-
nation of two utility functions for T.
Lemma 1:
Given the inelastic metric (1), the expected user utility for a session of length T+1
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Lemma 1 shows that the expected utility for a session with length T+1 and user val-
uation V is the weighted sum between the utility for a session length T, but valuation V
minus the price for the additional period (where the weight equals the probability to
win the additional auction), and the utility for a session length T and no user valuation
at all (weighted by the probability to lose the last auction). This corresponds naturally
to the auction process branching into “win the last auction” and “lose the last auction”
and their respective returns. But this can also be used for the following “reverse” situa-
tion: assume the bidder starts the auction series for a session length T+1 and has an
optimal bidding strategy   for the whole series. Then at the first auction, the
branching into “winning” and “losing” is identical, and again the expected utility is the
weighted sum between these two cases. But now, if the bidder has won the first auction
and paid a charge of  , Lemma 1 allows the conclusion that for the rest of the auction
series, the strategy   is equal to the original strategy. In this way, condi-
tional on having won the previous auctions, the bid submitted for any auction 
during the series does no longer depend on a holistic view on the complete auction
series, but needs to be based only on the remaining number   of auctions in the
series and the remaining user budget  . This induces a Markovian-type prop-
erty, which will be generalized in the following section.
3.3 “Markovian Bidding” in Multi-period Auctions
Bidding for a multi-period auction may be considered as a special case of combina-
torial auctions where the combination of commodities consists of subsequent periods
of resource usage. It has already been mentioned that calculating optimal strategies for
combinatorial auctions is in general an NP-complete problem. On the other hand, a
multi-period auction is not experienced by the bidder as a combinatorial auction, but
moreover as a series of subsequent single-period auctions. Therefore, we postulate the
following property:
Markovian Property for Multi-period Auctions: 
Let   describe the optimal bidding strategy for the  -th individual auction in the
course of a T-period auction procedure. Then   is assumed to fulfill the following
equation:
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σT τ 1 + () VT 1 , VT 2 , … VT τ , ,, , {} σT τ 1 + () VT τ , {} =In other words: at any stage within an auction series, the user is not interested in the
history of completed auctions. Instead, the next bid is based only on the remaining
budget and the remaining session holding time. This property allows bidders to neglect
the combinatorial perspective of a multi-period auction and behave instead like in a
series of individual auctions. The next subsection presents examples of such bidding
strategies. 
3.4 Two Examples of Markovian Bidding Strategies
We consider a single link with capacity C where auctions take place periodically. At
the beginning of each auction period τ, a number N(τ) new user requests arrive accord-
ing to a Poisson distribution with rate λ. As user sessions generally have a duration of
more than one auction period, additionally a number of users with already established
sessions over that link compete for the same capacity C. All users are assumed to
behave symmetrically, i.e. use the same strategy (for fairness reasons).
Each newly arriving user n requests a capacity of   for a total session lenght of 
subsequent auction periods. Moreover, we assume that user n is willing to pay an aver-
age price of   per capacity unit per period, yielding an overall total user budget (i.e.
valuation) of   for the whole session. Auctions are performed as
second-price auctions, i.e. at auction τ all winning users pay a unique price   per
capacity unit, where   equals the highest bid among all losing competitors.
Assume without loss of generality that  , i.e. each user requests the same
capacity, and define   to be the total remaining
budget of user n after having won auctions 1 ... t in the multi-period auction series,
with respective outcomes   of these second-price auctions. It is well-known that for
second-price auctions, the dominant bidding strategy for each user is to reveal her true
valuation of the commodity, i.e. the willingness-to-pay [18]. In the case of a multi-
period auction, this so-called incentive compatibility together with the Markovian
property for multi-period auctions may lead to different possible bidding strategies
for the next auction t+1, depending on the interpretation of what the willing-
ness-to-pay is in this case, e.g.:
• Strategy A:   and  , i.e. the user always bids the
whole remaining budget.
• Strategy B (proportional bidding):   and  , i.e. the
user bids a linear proportion of the remaining budget, depending on the remaining
session holding time.
In Section 4.3, a simulative evaluation of strategies A and B is presented in
comparison with two new strategies that are related to the concept of second-chance
auctions as it is introduced in the next section.
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4.1 The Concept of Second-chance Auctions
Whereas Section 3 has presented some insight how to deal with the Bid Distribution
Problem, we will focus on the Locality Problem next. It has already been mentioned
that this problem arises in a spatial as well as a temporal sense. For connections over
multiple links, where the links perform individual auctions, an inadequate bid distribu-
tion policy may easily leave some links with bids too low to win the local auctions,
whereas on other links, submitted bids are higher than necessary. Similarly, in a multi-
period auction, the bid distribution over time could turn out to be not adequate for just
one or a few period auctions, whereas for the rest of the session holding time, winning
the auctions is no problem. 
In both cases, the consequences of such local problems may be substantial, espe-
cially for already established connections where one weak link might force the whole
chain to be shut down. Therefore, we propose a much more reasonable approach by
giving already established connections that experience the loss of one or more local
auction (either in one of the links or in one of the holding time periods) a “second
chance”: without closing the connection immediately, the user is allowed to increase
the partial bid for the lost auction(s) ex post, if her budget allows for that.
4.2 Multi-period Second-chance Auctions
Closely related to the bidding strategies described in Section 3.4, here are two fla-
vors of Markovian bidding strategies for the case of second-chance auctions:
• Strategy C (simple second-chance): As with strategy B, bidders submit
, with   as first bid. In case they lose auction t0,
i.e.  , they are allowed to increase ex post their bid to
, which is also used as their bid for the next auction
period  t0+1, if this still complies with the remaining budget, i.e. if
; otherwise the session is closed.
 is again calculated as usual.
• Strategy D (savings book): Define   (the “savings book”) as new control vari-
able for bidder n with  . As with strategy B, each bidder submits
. If the bidder wins auction t, i.e.
,   is set to
 . (5)
If the auction is lost and  , i.e. if there is a sufficient amount
deposited on the “savings book”  , the user is allowed to increase her bid ex
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like in (5), whereas the session has to be closed otherwise.
4.3 Simulative Evaluation of Multi-period Auctions on a Single Link
The  simulative evaluation of the single-link case has been performed in the
AMPL/CPLEX language [2]. As default values we use link capacity  , arrival
rate   for new users, identical user capacity requests  , i.i.d.
session lengths   uniformly distributed within  , and i.i.d. integer unit
period prices   drawn from a uniform   distribution. In absence of
congestion, the users pay a minimum price   in order to cover fixed network
cost. All the new sessions start at the beginning of the time interval, no admissions are
allowed between the auctions.
Figure 1 (left) shows the auction results for the four strategies over time. We see that
the second-price strategies C and D as well as strategy B lead to basically stable (and
identical) market prices, whereas the outcome of strategy A is obviously irregular. This
is emphasized by the fact that less than 0.2% of the sessions are successfully finished
under strategy A. Therefore, Figure 1 (right) focuses on the three remaining strategies
and demonstrates that the proportion of aborted sessions is reduced drastically by
applying second-chance auctions. Moreover, strategy D results both in the largest
number of completed sessions and the smallest drop ratio. Therefore, we may conclude
that second-chance auctions have significant advantages compared to simple schemes,
and that strategy D is dominating the other two strategies in every respect.
Figure 2 (left) demonstrates the effect of increasing load λ on the system. With session
arrival rate   increasing from 1 to 25, we observe that, with respect to the percentage
of completed calls, the second-chance strategies C and D clearly dominate strategy B.
Moreover, strategy D (“savings book”) performs significantly better than strategy C
throughout the load range.
In the same setting, Figure 2 (right) depicts the absolute values for social welfare
(i.e. the sum of satisfied user valuations) after a total number of 400 network auction
periods. We observe that strategy B dominates strategy C, mirroring the loss of social
welfare due to increased user friendliness under second-chance auctions. Similarly,
strategy D dominates strategy C due to its better control mechanism for the decision
whether rebidding is useful or not. The relationship between strategy B and D is inter-
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Figure 1: Auction Prices for Different Strategies (left) and Completed vs Dropped 
Sessions (right)
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λesting: for smaller session arrival rates, strategy B’s ability to react faster to arriving
new sessions (which may bid higher than the running ones) slightly outperforms strat-
egy D, whereas for higher arrival rates, strategy D’s control mechanism leads to
increasingly better results than strategy B. Summarizing, these simulations again dem-
onstrate the significant advantages of strategy D over the other strategies.
5 Protocol Aspects of Second-chance Auctions
In this section, we present a high-level description of an auction protocol for the sec-
ond-chance mechanism described in the previous sections. The protocol is currently
implemented on an MPLS testbed using XML technology to encode the messages con-
taining the protocol primitives as described below.
Set up as an end user service, the auction service may be presented on a web page
from which the user learns about auction rules and parameters such as: second chance
mechanism, supported commodities and QoS classes, minimum bid price etc. The user
may select a commodity, then she is redirected to the corresponding ingress router
(auctioneer), since the auctions on paths can be performed in a decentralized way.  In
Figure 3, we give a typical interaction example, while in Figure 4, the complementary
view on the time axis is given. The protocol consists of the following messages:
• subscribe (user_agent, commodity, qos_class)
This message from userAgent to auctioneer shows the interest in participating to an
auction. The user_agent  is used for authentication purpose, the commodity and
QoSclass are relevant for auctions accross network paths.
• publish (session_token, next_auction_time, current_price)
The auctioneer checks the availability of auctions on this path/link, the user pay-
ment possibilities, and issues a token for the user to be used in the next interactions,
informs him/her about the current market price and  time of  the next auction. 
• submitBid(session_token, bid, bandwidth) 
The user sends a bid (price per time and bandwidth unit), specifies the bandwidth
required. The auction engine recognizes whether this is the first round. This mes-
sage can be used by the auctioneer to perform a payment reservation for the
amount = bid*bandwidth*auction_period.
Figure 2: Auction Results under Varying Load Conditions: Proportion of completed 
sessions (left) and total social welfare (right) for strategies B, C and D
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Strategy D• auctionResult (result, bw_granted, price)
The auctioneer responds after the auction with the  result and the market price and
bandwidth granted (can be a part of the requested bandwidth). This message is cou-
pled with the payment order and is used by the user to start the application (only if
it is the first round) and to update the budget account for this session.
In case of a low bid, the auctioneer request raising the bid (for the last and next
period). The user can accept with a submitBid() or refuse with bye(). In case of no
response (timeout), the auctioneer closes the session. After such a low bid interac-
tion, the user may continue with the normal bid value (according to her strategy). 
UserA gent Auctioneer
1: subscribe(user_agent, commodity, qos_class)
2: publish(session_token, next_auction_time=100, current_price)
3: submitBid(session_token, bid=10, bandwidth)
6: AuctionResult(result=success, bw_granted, price=9, next_auction_time=300)
4: AuctionResult(result=success, bw_granted, price=8, next_auction_time=200)
8: AuctionResult(result=low_bid, bw_granted, price=11, next_auction_time=400)
9: submitBid(sesion_token, bid=11, bandwidth)
low bid: the 
agent has to 
raise the bid 
or disconnect
bye (reason=budget)
11: bye (reason=timeout)
rebid, next 
round
5: submitBid(session_token, bid=10, bandwidth)
7: submitBid(session_token, bid=10, bandwidth)
10: AuctionResult(result=success, bw_granted, price=11, next_auction_time=500)
Figure 3: Message Passing Diagram6 Conclusions and Further Work
This paper deals with auction mechanisms for multi-link multi-period sessions in
the Internet. After introducing the new concepts of “Markovian bidding” and “second-
chance auctioning”, multi-period auctions on a single link have been investigated and
evaluated through a simulative comparison of different user strategies. Finally, an auc-
tion protocol for second-chance auctions has been presented. 
Throughout the paper, it has been indicated that the considered multi-period case is
closely related to the multi-link case, i.e. end-to-end connections consisting of several
concatenated links which have to be auctioned independently. The second-chance ana-
logue in this case is based on preferential treatment for already established connections
and thus increases the user acceptance at only marginal cost for the provider. 
Current work deals especially with extending the “second-chance” concept also for
Internet connections over a path consisting of multiple connected links (“multi-link
auctions”). Here, the main idea is to distinguish between newly arriving requests and
already established connections, and apply different auction mechanisms to both types.
Most notably, already established connections are preferred over new ones by giving
them a second chance for increasing their bid ex post in the case of a failing auction.
This is somewhat similar to CHiPS (Connection-Holder-is-Preferred Scheme) pro-
posed in [14] for an RSVP context. Whereas CHiPS works well as soon as a connec-
tion is established, the question of how to establish a connection for the first time has
been left open. Only recently, [1] has proposed a synchronous multi-link Dutch auction
that appears to have the potential for solving this open issue. Thus, we are confident
that a combinination of both approaches will lead to a Second-chance Auction Mecha-
nism (SAM) also for the multi-link case. Besides that, further work focuses on evaluat-
ing fairness aspects of SAM as well as implementing and evaluating SAM under vari-
ous real-life scenarios, especially for the case of optimal tunnel configuration in MPLS
networks.
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Figure 4: Timeline of Second-Chance Auction Example
time 
3:  4:  5:  6:  7:  8:  9: 
auctioneer 
    user 
10:  11: References
[1] C. Courcoubetis, M. P. Dramitinos, G. D. Stamoulis: An Auction Mechanism for
Bandwidth Allocation over Paths. International Teletraffic Congress ITC-17, Sal-
vador da Bahia, Brazil, December 2001, pp 1163-1174.
[2] CPLEX Solver, www.ilog.com
[3] M. Falkner, M. Devetsikiotis, I. Lambadaris: An Overview of Pricing Concepts
for Broadband IP Networks. IEEE Communications Surveys, 2nd Quarter 2000,
pp 2-13.
[4] G. Fankhauser, B. Stiller, C. Vögtli, B. Plattner: Reservation-based Charging in
an Integrated Services Network. 4th INFORMS Telecommunications Confer-
ence, Boca Raton, Florida, U.S.A., February 1997.
[5] N. Foukia, D. Billard, P. Reichl, B. Stiller: User Behavior for a Pricing Scheme in
a Multi-provider Scenario. International Workshop on Internet Service Quality
Economics, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A., Dec. 1999.
[6] J. Hershberger, Subhash Suri: Vickrey Pricing in Network Routing: Fast Payment
Computation. 42nd Annual Symposion on Foundations of Computer Science,
Las Vegas, Nevada, Oct. 2001.
[7] F. Jarray, L. Wynter: An Optimal Smart Market for the Pricing of Telecommuni-
cation Services. Technical Report 4310, INRIA, Rocquencourt, France, October
2001.
[8] P. Klemperer (ed.): The Economic Theory of Auctions. Edward Elgar Publishing,
Massachusetts, 2000.
[9] A. A. Lazar, N. Semret: Design and Analysis of the Progressive Second Price
Auction for Network Bandwidth Sharing. Telecommunication Systems, Special
Issue on Network Economics, 2000.
[10] J. MacKie-Mason, H. Varian: Generalized Vickrey Auctions. Technical Report,
Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 1994.
[11] J. MacKie-Mason, H. Varian: Pricing the Internet. In: B. Kahin, J. Keller (edts.):
Public Access to the Internet. MIT Press, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1995.
[12] L. McKnight, J. Bailey (edts.): Internet Economics. MIT Press, Cambridge,
U.S.A., 1997.
[13] P. Reichl, B. Stiller: Edge Pricing in Space and Time. 17th International Teletraf-
fic Congress ITC-17, Salvador da Bahia, Brazil, December 2001, pp. 1151-1162.
[14] P. Reichl, B. Stiller, G. Fankhauser: Auction Models for Multi-provider Internet
Connections. MMB’99, Trier, Germany, September 1999.
[15] B. Stiller, P. Reichl, S. Leinen: Pricing and Cost Recovery for Internet Services:
Practical Review, Classification and Application of Relevant Models. NETNOM-
ICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2001.
[16] W. Vickrey: Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.
Journal of Finance, Vol. 16, 1961, pp 8-37.
[17] M. Wellman, W. Walsh, P. Wurman, J. MacKie-Mason: Auction Protocols for
Decentralized Scheduling. Games and Economic Behavior 35, 271-303 (2001).
[18] E. Wolfstetter: Topics in Microeconomics. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, U.S.A., 1999.